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Jamming Problem of Root* 
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Root recently considered some problems in binary transmission i  
the presence of unknown additive noise, and reduced them to infinite 
games. For these he derived mixed strategies which in this note are 
shown to be optimal, providing the values of the games. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In a recent paper, Root (1961) considered two problems of binary 
transmission in the presence of additive noise provided by a jammer, 
the only restriction on the noise being that its power be bounded. This 
problem in effect reduced to the following infinite game: 
"A signal 0 or 1 is transmitted, each with probability ½. A jammer T 
can add to the transmitted signal any number a between 0 and a. From 
the sum y, the listener S must determine as best he can whether a 0 or a 1 
was transmitted." 
By "best" is meant that S maximizes his expected minimum prob- 
ability of correct identification of the signal. That is, if P(7, a) is the 
probability of correct identification when S uses a pure strategy V, and 
T a pure strategy a, we assume that the players adopt maximin and 
minimax mixed strategies respectively. Root showed that an upper 
bound on S's maximin expected probability of correct identification is 
1 
v = ~- + 2G' (1) 
and determined a strategy that achieves 
1 
V1 = ~ + 2[a~ 1]' (2) 
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where [x] is the largest integer less than or equal to x. If S's strategies 
are restricted to setting thresholds ¢~ and deciding on 0 if y </~ and 1 if 
y _-_ ~, where 1 -<_ /~ -<_ a + 1, then Root shows that the payoff function 
P(¢~, a) is given by 
(½, if 0 - __a<¢~- -  1 
! 
P(~,a)  =~1,  if ~- l<a  <~ (3) 
, if /3<a<a.  
He also shows that the threshold strategy for S that guarantees the 
expected payoff V1 is the choice 
fl = 1, 2, -.- , [a + 1] (4) 
with equal probabilities 1/[a -~- 1]. Using his results, what is shown in 
this note is that this is indeed an optimal strategy for the infinite game, 
because T can choose a mixed strategy that guarantees that S cannot 
attain an expected payoff higher than V1, which is hence the value of 
the game. Corresponding optimal strategies for T are 
a = k,~ + 1 , . . - , k+ [a] (5) 
with equal probabilities 1/[a + 1], where 0 = k = a - [a]. These are 
not necessarily the only optimal strategies. 
Proof: As in Root's paper, let dr(y) be the decision function used by 
S when he employs a pure strategy v and receives the signal y. 
dr(y) = 0 implies the decision 0. 
dr(y) = 1 implies the decision 1. 
Hence, 
P(% a) = ½(d~(a -f- 1) -t- 1 -- dr(a)). (6) 
If T uses the equiprobable strategies of Eq. (5), then the expected pay- 
off is 
-t-1 1] k+[a] fr Vk - [a ~=,.o P(% a) d% (7) 
where I" is the set of all possible S-strategies % Hence 
+1 1] k+ralo=~ frgk -- ~ (d~(a -~ 1) + 1 -- dr(a)) d~ 
2[a 
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- 2[a-~ 1] [a~- !] + .=k~ (dr(a ~- 1) -- dr(a)) d'y 
1 1 /r 
- 2 -~ 2[a -~ 1] (d~(k -{- [a]+ 1) -- dr(k)) d% 
But d~(k + [a] -~ 1) - dr(k) < 1. Therefore 
1 1 
Vk <- ~ -~ 2[a + 1- - - - - - ]  ' (8) 
which completes the proof, since from equation (2) S can always achieve 
this value. 
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